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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This shareholders' class action case comes on before this 
court on plaintiffs-appellants' appeal from a February 6, 
2001 order of the district court granting summary 
judgment to the defendant-appellee Ernst & Young LLP 
("Ernst"). See In re IKON Office Solutions Sec. Litig., 131 F. 
Supp. 2d 680 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Appellants are 
representatives of a certified class consisting of all persons 
who purchased common stock, convertible preferred stock, 
and/or call options of IKON Office Solutions, Inc. ("IKON") 
from October 15, 1997, through August 13, 1998. In their 
complaint they alleged that Ernst, IKON's accounting firm, 
violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.S 240.10b-5, 
promulgated thereunder, by issuing an unqualified audit 
report approving IKON's financial statements for fiscal year 
1997 knowing that they overstated IKON's pre-tax income 
or, even if Ernst did not have actual knowledge of the 
overstatement, by recklessly performing its audit. 
 
The district court granted Ernst's motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the appellants failed to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact with respect to two 
elements of a prima facie section 10(b) claim: scienter (that 
Ernst harbored an intent to deceive or acted with reckless 
disregard for the truth and accuracy of IKON's financial 
disclosures) and causation (that the inflated value of IKON's 
stock price dropped when the market reevaluated the 
security after a corrective disclosure). In addition, and in 
the alternative, the court granted Ernst's motion for partial 
summary judgment, ruling that it could not be liable to 
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certain members of the class under section 10(b) by reason 
of an October 15, 1997 press release IKON issued because 
Ernst itself did not communicate misrepresentations to 
investors in the press release -- the only activity proscribed 
by the statute. 
 
Because the record fails to establish a triable issue with 
respect to scienter, we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court without addressing loss causation or whether 
Ernst can be held liable under section 10(b) for IKON's 




A. Factual History 
 
IKON, which is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania, 
supplies copiers, printing systems, and related services 
throughout the United States, Canada, and Europe. Its 
shares are traded publicly on the New York Stock 
Exchange. Between 1995 and 1998, IKON embarked on a 
"transformation" business plan in which it acquired and 
consolidated close to 200 independent copier, technology- 
services, and outsourcing and imaging companies. See J.A. 
1331 (Jarrell Report). IKON intended to become an 
international provider of "office technology solutions," 
serving as a single source for networking services, office 
technology, and software needs, rather than simply 
distributing and servicing office products in domestic 
markets. See J.A. 1330-31 (Jarrell Report). 
 
Ernst, a "Big Five" accounting firm,1 served as the 
independent, outside auditor of IKON's September 30 fiscal 
year-end financial statements for a number of years, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The "Big Five" accounting firms are Arthur Andersen LLP, Deloitte & 
Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. For many years, the accounting industry 
was dominated by eight national firms. In 1989, the"Big Eight" was 
reduced to six members with the mergers of Ernst & Whinney and 
Arthur Young into Ernst & Young and Touche Ross and Deloitte Haskins 
& Sells into Deloitte & Touche. In 1998, the "Big Six" became the "Big 
Five" as Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers Lybrand to become 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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including the time encompassing the audit of IKON's 1997 
consolidated financial statements. See J.A. 113-14 (2d Am. 
Cplt. at P 101). Ernst designed its year-end audits to 
evaluate whether IKON's financial statements accurately 
and fairly reflected its financial position in accordance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP").2 In 
addition, Ernst performed certain internal audit functions 
for IKON, such as monitoring and evaluating its compliance 
with its own internal accounting policies and procedures. 
See J.A. 115 (2d Am. Cplt. at P 105). 
 
This dispute focuses on the soundness of Ernst's audit 
for fiscal year 1997. On October 15, 1997, after Ernst had 
completed the bulk of its audit work,3  IKON issued a press 
release discussing fourth-quarter and year-end results. See 
J.A. 5150-55. The release reported income from continuing 
operations totaling $204.9 million for fiscal 1997, a 15 
percent increase from fiscal 1996. See J.A. 5151. Ernst 
reviewed the press release before it was issued without 
proposing any modifications. See J.A. 3523 (Dillon Dep. 26- 
27). 
 
On December 24, 1997, Ernst publicly issued its 
unqualified, or "clean," audit opinion,4 stating that it had 
conducted its audit in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Auditing Principles ("GAAS"),5 and concluding that IKON's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. GAAP is "a technical accounting term that encompasses the 
conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to define accepted 
accounting practices at a particular time." See American Institute of 
Certified Public Accounts ("AICPA"), Statement of Auditing Standards No. 
69, P 69.02 (1992), quoted in Sanders v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 998, 1001 
n.3 (7th Cir. 2000). GAAP principles and standards provide a common 
framework by which financial statements from divers companies may be 
compared and adjudged. 
3. The final audit opinion was dated October 15, 1997, with the 
exception of note 8, dated October 27, 1997. See  J.A. 4701 (Graham 
Report). 
4. An "unqualified" or "clean" audit opinion is the highest level of 
assurance that an auditor can give on an organization's financial 
statements. Accountants will "qualify" their opinion where discrepancies 
are identified in a client's financial statements. 
5. GAAS are the standards prescribed by the Auditing Standards Board 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for the conduct 
of auditors in the performance of an examination. See SEC v. Arthur 
Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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1997 financial statements fairly reflected its financial 
position. See J.A. 4701 (Graham Report). Relevant portions 
of that unqualified audit opinion, which appeared in IKON's 
1997 Annual Report to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on Form 10-k, follow: 
 
       We have audited the accompanying consolidated 
       balance sheets of IKON Office Solutions, Inc . . . and 
       the related consolidated statements of income, changes 
       in stockholders' equity and cash flows for each of the 
       three years in the period ended September 30, 1997 
       . . . . We conducted our audits in accordance with 
       generally accepted auditing standards. Those 
       standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
       to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
       financial statements are free of material misstatement. 
       An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 
       supporting the amounts and disclosures in the 
       financial statements. An audit also includes assessing 
       the accounting principles used and significant 
       estimates made by management as well as evaluating 
       the overall financial statement presentation. We believe 
       that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
       opinion. In our opinion, the consolidated financial 
       statements referred to above present fairly, in all 
       material respects, the financial position of IKON Office 
       Solutions, Inc., and subsidiaries at September 30, 
       1997 and 1996, and the consolidated results of their 
       operations and their cash flows for each of the three 
       years in the period ended September 30, 1997, in 
       conformity with generally accepted accounting 
       principles. 
 
See J.A. 117 (2d Am. Cplt. at P 109). 
 
Following the release of the audit opinion and IKON's 
contemporaneous December 24, 1997 10-k filing with the 
SEC, share values of IKON common stock experienced a net 
gain. See J.A. 1371 (Chart Common 1). Within a matter of 
months, however, IKON's prospects soured. On April 22, 
1998, before the stock market opened, IKON announced 
that its second quarter earnings for fiscal year 1998 would 
be $0.35 per share, instead of $0.38 as expected by 
analysts. IKON also warned that third and fourth quarter 
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earnings would fall below expectations. See J.A. 1624-25 
(PR Newswire). IKON cited several reasons for the earnings 
shortfall, including issues related to its transformation 
process, competitive pressures, and costs associated with 
product rationalization. IKON, however, did not mention 
accounting charges to rectify discrepancies in its 1997 
financial statements. 
 
Later that morning the investment banking firm of 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. downgraded IKON to "market 
perform" from "recommend list," while Prudential Securities 
downgraded IKON from "buy" to "hold." See J.A. 1340 
(Jarrell Report). As a result, the price of IKON common 
stock dropped precipitously from $34.625 a share on April 
21, 1998, to close at $25.25 a share on April 22, 1998 -- 
a one-day decline of 27.08 percent. See J.A. 1371 (Chart 
Common 1). 
 
IKON's stock continued to decline over the remainder of 
the spring and summer of 1998. On June 26, 1998, after 
the market closed, IKON announced that it would miss its 
earnings estimate for the third quarter of 1998. See J.A. 
1341 (Jarrell Report). The following trading day, June 29, 
1998, shares of its common stock declined $6.75 to close at 
$15.31. See J.A. 1371 (Chart Common 1). On July 9, 1998, 
IKON CEO John Stuart resigned and was replaced by IKON 
Vice-President James Forese. See J.A. 1342 (Jarrell Report). 
 
With its market performance and economic prospects 
deteriorating, IKON engaged Ernst to review the books of 
each of its North American and United Kingdom business 
services, a project known as the "Special Procedures." See 
J.A. 1131-32 (Letter to Dinkelacker). Specifically, IKON 
instituted the Special Procedures when internal audit work 
in IKON's Florida district revealed signs of operational 
deficiencies and accounting errors, including problems with 
reconciling intercompany transactions. See J.A. 1087-1130 
(June 2, 1998 IKON Report on Florida district). 
 
To assist in this process, the IKON Board of Directors 
hired the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen ("Andersen") 
to review Ernst's work. See J.A. 3184-85 (McAleer Dep. 
138-41). Andersen was permitted to review all work papers 
prepared in connection with Ernst's 1997 audit, IKON's 
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first and second limited 1998 quarterly reviews, and the 
Special Procedures. 
 
On August 4, 1998, IKON issued a press release 
indicating that it was conducting a "full review of 
operations previously announced." See J.A. 1915 (IKON 
Press Release). On August 14, 1998, after the conclusion of 
an exhaustive review process, IKON announced the results 
of the Special Procedures: it would take a $110 million 
charge against earnings -- $94 million in pre-tax charges 
applied to its 1998 third quarter earnings, and would 
restate its previously reported, unaudited 1998 second 
quarter earnings to reflect $16 million in pre-tax charges. 
See J.A. 2459 (IKON Press Release). The $110 million in 
charges included $28 million to cover defaults on leases, 
$20 million for unpaid accounts receivable, $35 million for 
adjustments due to the breakdown in internal controls at 
four operating units, $20 million due to asset impairment, 
and $7 million in miscellaneous adjustments. The press 
release did not disclose whether the $110 million charge 
also corrected errors made in connection with IKON's 1997 
year-end consolidated financial statements. The price of 
IKON common stock rose by 62 cents, from $9.31 to $9.94 
a share on August 14 following the announcement of the 
results of the Special Procedures. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Shortly after IKON announced these disclosures, 
appellants commenced 16 actions against IKON and certain 
individual defendants related to it, alleging violations of 
sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. SS 78j(b) and 78t(a), and of Rule 10b-5, 17 
C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. In June 1999, prior to the close of 
discovery, appellants filed an amended complaint, adding 
Ernst as a defendant on the claim under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 alleging, in essence, that Ernst knew or should 
have been aware that IKON's 1997 financial statements 
substantially overstated pretax income. 
 
Thereafter, the district court consolidated the actions and 
appointed the lead plaintiffs, the City of Philadelphia 
through its Board of Pensions and Retirement, Oliver 
Scofield, and Lawrence Porter, to represent the interests of 
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a class certified to incorporate all those who acquired IKON 
securities between October 15, 1997 (the day of IKON's 
press release regarding its 1997 year-end results), and 
August 13, 1998 (the day before IKON announced the $110 
million in charges against earnings). 
 
In November 1999, the IKON defendants agreed to a 
settlement with the class for $111,000,000. The district 
court approved the settlement on May 9, 2000, leaving 
Ernst as the sole remaining defendant. See In re IKON 
Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Pa. 
2000). 
 
On February 6, 2001, one month prior to trial, the 
district court on Ernst's motion entered summary judgment 
in its favor completely extinguishing the case on two 
independent grounds -- appellants' failure to adduce 
sufficient evidence of both scienter and loss causation. In 
addition, the court, as we have indicated, granted Ernst a 
partial summary judgment. Appellants filed a timely notice 




We have jurisdiction over this appeal of a final judgment 
of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The 
district court exercised federal question jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1337, because the case arose under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78aa, and 




A. Standard of Review 
 
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same test the district court employed. See 
Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 
315 (3d Cir. 1999). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides, in 
pertinent part, that a court may grant summary judgment 
only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." 
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In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, 
we view the record and draw inferences in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. See Arnold M. Diamond, 
Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 
1999). If a non-moving party fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case on which it bears the burden of proof 
at trial, there is no issue as to a genuine issue of a material 
fact and thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 
 
Moreover, a party will not be able to withstand a motion 
for summary judgment merely by making allegations; 
rather, the party opposing the motion must go beyond its 
pleading and designate specific facts by use of affidavits, 
depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2458, 2553 (1986); 
see also GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 
199 (3d Cir. 2001). Only evidence "sufficient to convince a 
reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements of[the] 
prima facie case" merits consideration beyond the Rule 56 
stage. Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 
1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 
B. Section 10(b) 
 
Section 10(b) prohibits the "use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security, . . .[of] any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe . . . ." 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). Rule 
10b-5, promulgated under section 10(b), makes it unlawful 
for any person "[t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to 
make the statements made in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading 
. . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5(b). 
 
To state a valid claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b- 
5, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a 
misstatement or an omission of a material fact (2) with 
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scienter (3) in connection with the purchase or the sale of 
a security (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied and 
(5) that the plaintiff 's reliance was the proximate cause of 
his or her injury. See GFL Advantage Fund, 272 F.3d at 
212; Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
       1. Scienter 
 
Liability under section 10(b) may extend to secondary 
actors in the securities markets, as for example where an 
outside accounting firm prepares a fraudulent audit report 
that it knows will reach and likely influence the investing 
public. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 
1455 (1994) ("[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, 
accountant, or bank . . . may be liable as a primary violator 
under 10b-5"); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 
181 (3d Cir. 2000) (the "in connection with" prong is 
satisfied where the misrepresentations are material and 
disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a 
reasonable investor would rely). Of course, imposition of 
liability on this basis is consistent with the primary 
purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which is to 
protect against manipulated stock prices by imposing strict 
and extensive disclosure requirements, irrespective of the 
type of actor that disseminates information to the investing 
public. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 
(1934), reprinted 1934 WL 1289. 
 
However, by its terms, section 10(b) does not prohibit 
aiding and abetting. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191, 
114 S.Ct. at 1455.6 To establish securities fraud, plaintiffs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Central Bank, the Supreme Court considered whether section 10(b) 
liability could extend to actors who do not commit a manipulative or 
deceptive act within the meaning of section 10(b) but who instead aid 
and abet a violation. In that case, the plaintiffs sought to hold a bank 
that served as indenture trustee for two separate bond issues liable 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for agreeing to delay an independent 
review of appraisal of land which secured bonds until approximately six 
months after the bonds were to be sold. The bonds were defaulted on 
before completion of the independent appraisal. See 511 U.S. at 168, 
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must establish a more exacting threshold of scienter-- "a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or 
defraud," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 
n.12, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1381 n.12 (1976), or, at a minimum, 
"highly unreasonable (conduct), involving not merely 
simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme 
departure from the standards of ordinary care, . . . which 
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is 
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the 
actor must have been aware of it." SEC v. Infinity Group 
Co., 212 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 
S.Ct. 1228 (2001) (citing McLean v. Alexander , 599 F.2d 
1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979)); see Healey v. Catalyst Recovery 
of Pa., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980) (section 10b 
recklessness closer to intentional conduct than 
indifference); see also In re Advanta Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 
525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999). Simple computation errors or 
slight accounting mistakes will not suffice to establish 
scienter.7 
 
Appellants advance the following claims to demonstrate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
114 S.Ct. at 1443. The Supreme Court, finding no basis within the 
language or legislative history of the statute and reluctant to allow 
plaintiffs to circumvent the reliance requirement of section 10(b) simply 
by demonstrating that a defendant gave some modicum of aid to those 
engaged in proscribed activities, refused to find an implied private right 
of action to impose aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b). See 
id. at 176-80, 114 S.Ct. at 1447-50. 
 
7. To prevail on a section 10(b) claim, however, appellants need not 
demonstrate that the audit for fiscal year 1997 amounted to a 
"pretended audit" as Ernst maintains throughout its brief. In McLean, we 
suggested the type of circumstantial evidence that could support an 
inference of bad faith, for instance, "[a] showing of shoddy accounting 
practices amounting at best to a pretended audit , or of grounds 
supporting a representation so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that 
there was no genuine belief back of it." McLean, 599 F.2d at 1198 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). We 
did not intend in McLean, however, to restrict the scienter threshold to 
the precise contours of this list. Rather, if a plaintiff can show -- by 
whatever means -- that defendants "did not have an honest belief in the 
truth of their statements, then they are liable, so far as (scienter) is 
concerned." Id. 
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that Ernst knew of or was reckless in failing to discover 
deficiencies in IKON's financial statements in connection 
with IKON's October 15, 1997 press release and Ernst's 
December 24, 1997 audit opinion:8 (1) that Ernst failed to 
investigate sufficiently evidence of fraud by IKON or take 
into account other conspicuous risk factors or "red flags" 
that would have alerted Ernst to the fallacious 
computations; and (2) that Ernst impermissibly relied on 
IKON's internal controls in preparing its audit calculations. 
As a result of these alleged deficiencies and other violations 
of GAAS, appellants attribute $20.8 million in known errors 
and $30.1 million in reckless errors to Ernst's audit 
opinion. 
 
We have concluded, however, after an intensive study of 
the formidable record in this case, that even when viewed 
with hindsight it does not supply a basis from which to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The district court entered judgment for Ernst as to the period from 
October 15, 1997, until December 24, 1997, in which appellants 
predicated their theory of liability on IKON's October 15 press release. 
The district court held that IKON's press release, which neither 
mentioned Ernst by name, nor attributed any representations to Ernst, 
could not "form a basis for a Section 10(b) claim," because, in light of 
Central Bank, Ernst at best facilitated the principal actor's disclosures 
and, therefore, did not "make" a material misstatement (or omission) 
upon which the investing public relied. See 131 F. Supp. 2d at 685 n.5 
(citing Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
Noting further that some courts have applied a "substantial 
participation" test with respect to primary liability for secondary 
actors, 
the district court found no basis for liability to attach to Ernst under 
this 
standard because the company neither drafted nor directed any 
meaningful aspect of the press release such that IKON's representations 
could be attributed to Ernst. See id. (citing Cashman v. Coopers & 
Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). While a number of 
courts have rejected the "substantial participation" test as inconsistent 
with Central Bank's repudiation of aiding-and-abetting liability for 
section 10(b), see Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 
1226 (10th Cir. 1996), we need not address this issue because we affirm 
the district court on scienter grounds only. As appellants conceded at 
oral argument, if the record cannot plausibly support an inference of 
intent to deceive or recklessness on Ernst's part in preparing its 1997 
audit, then appellants' section 10(b) claim must fail for the entirety of 
the class period, including from October 15, 1997, to December 24, 
1997. 
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draw a reasonable inference that Ernst recklessly or 
knowingly issued a materially false and misleading audit 
opinion after reviewing IKON's 1997 year-end financial 
statements.9 While a determination of whether a party acted 
with scienter, intertwined as it may be with an assessment 
of witness credibility, often cannot be undertaken 
appropriately on summary judgment proceedings,10 in this 
case, even accepting arguendo that, as appellants assert, 
$54.9 million of the $110 million charge taken at the 
conclusion of the Special Procedures should have been 
recorded as of September 30, 1997, we are satisfied that 
the record establishes that Ernst's failure to do so was not 
without a good faith belief or reasonable basis. 
 
At the outset, the magnitude of Ernst's audit for fiscal 
year 1997 bears mentioning: six full scope audits, including 
one performed at IKON's leasing arm, IKON Capital, Inc.; 
eight localized audits at IKON business units that 
generated 50 percent of its revenues; a host of procedures 
performed at IKON's corporate headquarters; full reviews of 
previous years' audits; extensive external testing of IKON's 
account balances as the primary support for the audit 
opinion; work-output totaling 70 percent more than the 
hours budgeted to the Northern California district (1,014 as 
opposed to 600), where the implementation of a new 
computer system impeded review; all told, over 10,000 
hours of labor expended on an account to which 8,250 
hours originally were budgeted (a 20 percent overall 
increase). See J.A. 5447-51 (Mulherin Decl.PP 11, 12, 18, 
21, 23); J.A. 4778-82 (workpaper); J.A. 3149, 4803-06 
(workpapers); J.A. 3147 (workpaper). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As this litigation is well beyond the pleading stage, appellants 
overstate the significance of caselaw suggesting that allegations of 
violations of GAAP or GAAS, coupled with allegations of ignoring "red 
flags," can be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in a securities 
fraud action. See Reply Br. of Appellants at 10-11 (citing, inter alia, In 
re 
Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2000); In re Leslie 
Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
 
10. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 1552 
(1999) ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the 
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions") 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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It is equally notable that Arthur Andersen, after 
conducting its independent review during the Special 
Procedures, found nothing that "would be a significant 
issue" regarding the quality of Ernst's opinion, and that in 
coming to this conclusion Andersen was assessing the work 
of a major rival in the national accounting market. See J.A. 
3185 (McAleer Dep. 142). Though not performing an 
outright audit of the 1997 opinion or financial statements 
for compliance with GAAS or GAAP, Andersen allocated 
hundreds of hours of labor to its examination of the work 
papers produced by Ernst in 1997. See J.A. 3184-85 
(McAleer Dep. 138 44). After this examination Andersen 
concluded that the "balance sheet was solid" as of 
September 30, 1997, and that the computation of reserves 
was neither aggressive, nor conservative but rather 
"essentially in the middle, solid," and, in fact, concurred in 
IKON's decision not to restate the 1997 financial 
statements. See J.A. 3185, 3188 (McAleer Dep. 144, 155- 
56). One Andersen partner involved in reviewing the 1997 
working papers, Thomas Costello, stated that Andersen 
became aware of "nothing . . . that was viewed to be a 
significant deficiency" with respect to GAAS. See J.A. 3256 
(Costello Dep. 208). Likewise, the Chairman of the Audit 
Committee for the IKON Board, James R. Birle, indicated 
that Andersen did not "find anything fundamentally wrong 
with what [Ernst] ha[d] done, so they gave them a passing 
grade." See J.A. 3301 (Birle Dep. 113). While appellants are 
correct that Andersen's conclusions do not provide cover 
categorically to insulate Ernst from liability, 11 the fact that 
Andersen endorsed IKON's decision not to restate the 1997 
financial statements nevertheless is highly probative of the 
competence of Ernst's 1997 audit opinion and undermines 
any suggestion that Ernst could not reasonably have 
opined that IKON's financial statements fairly presented its 
financial condition in accordance with GAAP. See In re 
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. This is especially so when it is considered that as a condition to 
being awarded the contract, Andersen agreed with Ernst, in writing, not 
to report to IKON's board if it determined that the 1997 audit did not 
comport with accepted auditing standards. See  J.A. 1239-40 (Letter to 
Arthur Andersen); 3256-67 (Costello Dep. 208-09). 
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1994) (in establishing scienter, "[t]he plaintiff must prove 
that . . . the accounting judgments which were made were 
such that no reasonable accountant would have made the 
same decisions if confronted with the same facts"). 
 
We conclude that none of the specific errors appellants 
assert raises a material dispute of fact on which to 
predicate a finding of scienter. The record makes clear with 
respect to appellants' claim that Ernst ignored allegations 
that IKON CFO Kurt Dinkelacker ("Dinkelacker") had been 
"cooking the books" and supplying fraudulent numbers 
during the 1997 audit that Ernst took appropriate steps to 
determine whether the allegations had any merit. To begin 
with, the alleged accuser, IKON official Peter Shoemaker, 
denied under oath that he ever made the remark. See J.A. 
2988-91 (Shoemaker Dep. 7-21). Furthermore, George 
Berry ("Berry"), the Ernst partner responsible for the IKON 
audit, testified that he understood the remark to mean that 
Dinkelacker had been accused of characterizing operational 
expenses as "transformation expenses." See  J.A. 3048 
(Berry Dep. 57-58). However, the allegation was deemed 
groundless as Ernst just recently had reviewed IKON's 
"transformation expenses" and found no improprieties with 
regard to the classification of expenses. See  J.A. 351 (Nepa 
Dep. 10-11). Finally, IKON's top management engaged 
outside counsel, two senior partners in the law firm of 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, to investigate the 
allegation; they subsequently found "nothing to the `cooking 
the books' allegation." See J.A. 259-60 (Pl. Response to 
Ernst's First Set of Requests for Admissions). 
 
Appellants next argue that a trier of fact may make a 
finding of scienter from evidence that Ernst deliberately 
disregarded a warning from an IKON officer that various 
districts were being forced to perform "unnatural acts" and 
boost income by manipulating IKON's reserves. Specifically, 
in July 1998, Berry received written notice of these 
allegations from IKON official Michael Dudek ("Dudek"), 
who relayed information that several IKON employees 
indicated that they were uncomfortable with certain 
accounting directions which they had been receiving from 
IKON Corporate. See J.A. 1136 (Dudek Memoranda). 
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A jury could not plausibly infer an extreme departure 
from the standards of ordinary care on the basis of this 
evidence. First and most significantly, nothing in the record 
links the concerns raised late in 1998 regarding the 
manipulation of reserves to Ernst's preparation of its audit 
opinion in 1997, the only time-period where Ernst's state of 
mind is relevant to the section 10(b) claim involved here. 
Furthermore, the record establishes that Ernst responded 
appropriately to the allegations of misconduct raised in the 
Dudek memoranda: Berry ensured that top IKON 
management was aware of the allegations, encouraged 
IKON to hire an independent counsel to investigate (which 
it did - the Philadelphia law firm of Dechert Price & 
Rhoads), delivered the Dudek memoranda to the 
independent counsel, and incorporated additional steps 
into the Special Procedures to review the newly raised 
concerns. See J.A. 354-55 (Nepa Dep. 23-28). The mere fact 
that Ernst did not conduct its own fraud investigation or 
alert its field auditors to the allegations of fraud is not 
probative, as the relevant inquiry is bad faith, not judgment.12 
See In re Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1426-27 ("self- 
righteous" assertion that defendant did not conduct an 
audit precisely as plaintiffs might have insufficient to 
establish fraud); see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206, 96 
S.Ct. at 1387 (Congress did not intend for anyone to be 




12. Under the AICPA's professional norms, an auditor need conduct its 
own investigation after discovering information which relates to 
previously evaluated financial statements only if the information existed 
at the time of the original report, is deemed reliable, and would have 
changed the report previously made. See J.A. 1137-39 (AU S 561, 
"Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditor's 
Report," PP .04-.05). Furthermore, AUS 561 advises the auditor to 
"discuss the matter with his client at whatever management levels he 
deems appropriate, including the board of directors, and request 
cooperation in whatever investigation may be necessary." See J.A. 1137 
(P .04). Here, Ernst ensured that board members were aware of the 
allegations, confirmed that IKON had retained independent investigators 
as well as outside accountants, and, in all respects, fully cooperated in 
the investigation. 
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In an effort to obtain a reversal of the summary judgment 
and secure a jury trial, appellants lay out the following 
scenario: Ernst prepared a checklist entitled "Internal 
Control and Fraud Considerations" during the planning 
stage of the 1997 audit (J.A. 1144-63); the pre-printed, 20- 
page checklist details dozens of possible risk factors; Ernst 
checked "yes" for the presence of a handful of risk factors, 
including, inter alia, "unduly aggressive earnings targets," 
"excessive interest in maintaining or increasing[IKON's] 
stock price or earnings trend," and a commitment to 
achieving "what appear to be unduly aggressive or 
unrealistic forecasts;" these responses, appellants maintain, 
demonstrate conclusively that a "significant risk of financial 
error existed" and raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Ernst knew that IKON personnel were under 
pressure to fake revenues and artificially inflate operating 
results.13 See Br. of Appellants at 17, 19. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Appellants also rely on an August 22, 1997 memorandum from 
Dinkelacker to suggest Ernst's actual awareness of IKON's fraudulent 
scheme to overstate income. The memo, addressed to various IKON 
district presidents and corporate officers and entitled "Follow-up on Cash 
Generation Initiative and 4Q Forecast," states, in relevant terms, as 
follows: 
 
       I would like to have a telephone conversation . . . on IKON's 
current 
       cash flow position and the cash results for July. We need to make 
       every effort to generate significant cash flows for the remainder 
of 
       the year . . . the updated forecast for the fourth quarter [ ] is 
not a 
       pretty picture . . . we must pull out all the stops to achieve 150 
       million in operating income from the field for the fourth quarter. 
       IKON can not afford another miss. I would like to discuss certain 
       opportunities relating to accounts receivable and inventory 
valuation 
       reserves, and I want to ensure that we have an understanding 
       around other general issues including the propriety of bonus 
       accruals. 
 
J.A. 1241 (emphasis in original). 
 
However, even accepting appellants' proffered interpretation that the 
memo served as an "injunction" or "command" from Dinkelacker to strip 
IKON operating units of reserves for doubtful accounts and lease 
defaults, see Br. of Appellants at 14-15, insofar as we are aware nothing 
in the record suggests that anyone from Ernst was aware of this memo 
as of December 24, 1997, when the final audit opinion issued. 
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Appellants fail, however, to explicate that the checklist 
contained 98 "no" answers to potential risks or that it was 
prepared in the pre-audit planning stages, before Ernst 
actually undertook its review of IKON's 1997 financial 
statements to appraise the validity of these concerns. 
Indeed, the questionnaire itself makes clear that"the 
relative importance of risk factors varies among 
engagements" such that the form can provide "only a 
portion of the understanding about an entity's internal 
control" that is required to plan an audit. See J.A. 1144-45. 
The simple fact that Ernst identified IKON management's 
strong preference for favorable earnings, standing alone, 
does not raise an inference of scienter sufficient to survive 
a summary judgment motion predicated on the absence of 
scienter. See Acito v. Imcera Group, Inc. 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (allegation that defendants were motivated to 
defraud the public because an inflated stock price would 
increase their compensation insufficient because"[i]f 
scienter could be pleaded on that basis alone, virtually 
every company in the United States that experiences a 
downturn in stock price could be forced to defend securities 
fraud actions"). In fact, rather than probative of 
recklessness, the document tends to corroborate Ernst's 
diligence in conducting the 1997 audit, identifying potential 
risks at an early stage in accordance with professional 
standards. See AU S 316 (1998) (an auditor has a duty to 
assess the "risk of material misstatement of financial 
statements due to fraud") (quoted in P. Schoenfeld Asset 
Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 589, 607 (D.N.J. 
2001)). 
 
We also reject appellants' argument that scienter credibly 
may be inferred from Ernst's reliance on IKON's defective 
internal controls.14 While IKON's internal accounting 
controls well may have been unreliable during fiscal year 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. "Internal accounting controls" refers to the mechanism by which 
companies monitor their accounting system (their individualized method 
of processing transactions) for errors and irregularities in order to 
safeguard company assets and ensure that records are sufficiently 
reliable. See SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd. , 567 F. Supp. 724, 750 
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (citing SEC ruling P No. 82,815, reprinted in 36 Bus. 
Law. 3 (April 1981)). 
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1997, the record, except with respect to the fourth quarter,15 
does not connect these internal deficiencies to Ernst's 
independent, external audit. To the contrary, Ernst adopted 
an "effective/not rely" approach during the 1997 
year-end audit,16 wherein, after scrutinizing IKON's internal 
controls to confirm their effectiveness (and making 
recommendations to IKON officers for improvement where 
deemed necessary), Ernst nevertheless opted not  to defer to 
IKON's internal audit findings and processes. See J.A. 627 
(Generalized Audit Program Steps, Year Ending Sept. 30, 
1997) ("substantive testing without placing reliance on the 
related systems is the most efficient way to audit"); see also 
J.A. 5450 (Mulherin Decl. PP 17-18) ("[W]e determined that 
IKON's overall internal control environment was effective 
. . . . However, we would not rely on the testing of controls 
as the primary support for our audit opinion. Rather, we 
would perform substantive testing -- such as analytical 
procedures and tests of details -- to serve as our principal 
source of audit evidence"). Absent further evidence 
affirmatively linking IKON's internal controls to Ernst's 
audit opinion, the record does not raise a genuine issue of 
material fact from which a jury could conclude that Ernst 
knowingly or blindly adhered to faulty internal controls or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. In that quarter, Ernst employed a "roll forward method" that 
contemplated some degree of reliance on IKON's internal controls. 
Certain location teams performed audit procedures three months prior to 
fiscal year-end (June 30, 1997), and then "rolled forward" the results to 
fiscal year-end by doing limited testing of account balances and internal 
controls for the interim three-month period. See  J.A. 5450 (Mulherin 
Decl. P 18). Appellants have not specified how Ernst's limited reliance on 
IKON's internal accounting processes undermined or otherwise affected 
the final audit opinion. 
 
16. Appellants place undue emphasis on the fact that Ernst's 1998 
"ineffective/not rely" audit strategy by comparison was far more 
effective, 
for example, confirming more than 600 accounts receivable in the 
Northern California district, as opposed to a sample size of 26 generated 
in 1997. See J.A. 1012 (IKON Northern California district, Accounts 
Receivable Confirmation, Sept. 30, 1997); 1061 (IKON Northern 
California, Trade Accounts Receivable, Sept. 30, 1998). Again, however, 
the relevant inquiry for purposes of section 10(b) is recklessness 
bordering on an intent to deceive, a finding to which these facts do not 
lend support. 
 
                                20 
 
 
accounting practices. See Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 
775 (9th Cir. 1994) (deficiencies in internal controls of a 
company are immaterial to the audit report itself because 
in essence they are matters of which only management 
should be aware); Danis v. USN Communications Inc., 121 
F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (without more, 
auditor's knowledge about problems in a client's 
operational systems could support an inference only of 
negligence, not recklessness). 
 
Having failed to present concrete evidence from which a 
jury plausibly could conclude that Ernst acted in a reckless 
manner, appellants purport to raise a material dispute with 
respect to scienter by parsing the 1997 audit for specific 
defects as evidence that Ernst acted recklessly with respect 
to the 1997 audit as a whole. 
 
However, the discovery of discrete errors after subjecting 
an audit to piercing scrutiny post-hoc does not, standing 
alone, support a finding of intentional deceit or of 
recklessness. See In re Software Toolworks Inc. , 50 F.3d 
615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994) ("the mere publication of 
inaccurate accounting figures, or a failure to follow GAAP, 
without more, does not establish scienter") (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 
797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (misapplication of 
accounting principles by an independent auditor does not 
establish scienter). An audit does not guarantee that a 
client's accounts and financial statements are correct any 
more than a sanguine medical diagnosis guarantees well- 
being; indeed, even an audit conducted in strict accordance 
with professional standards countenances some degree of 
calibration for tolerable error which, on occasion, may 
result in a failure to detect a material omission or 
misstatement. See AICPA General Standard No. 3 (audit 
requires only due professional care) (cited in Vladimir v. 
Deloitte & Touche LLP, 1997 WL 151330, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 31, 1997)). 
 
Rather, the "objective of the ordinary examination of 
financial statements by the independent auditor is the 
expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they 
present financial position, results of operations, and 
changes in financial position in conformity with generally 
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accepted accounting principles." AU S 110.01 (quoted in 
United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786 n.27 (9th Cir. 
1978)). In other words, in issuing an opinion, the auditor 
certifies only that it exercised appropriate, not flawless, 
levels of professional care and judgment. See La Rossa v. 
Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 943 (3d Cir. 1968) 
("Those who hire (experts) are not justified in expecting 
infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care and 
competence. They purchase service, not insurance.") (citing 
Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (Cal. 1954)). 
 
Thus, to give rise to section 10(b) liability for fraud, the 
mere second-guessing of calculations will not suffice; 
appellants must show that Ernst's judgment -- at the 
moment exercised -- was sufficiently egregious such that a 
reasonable accountant reviewing the facts and figures 
should have concluded that IKON's financial statements 
were misstated and that as a result the public was likely to 
be misled. Cf. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 
1978) (rejecting "fraud by hindsight" because the law does 
not expect clairvoyance). 
 
Nothing in the record meets this demanding threshold. 
For example, appellants assert that Ernst had actual 
knowledge of $20.8 million in errors when it rendered its 
audit opinion. But they derive this figure from their 
singular and fastidious vision as to how the 1997 audit 
sensibly should have been conducted. The allegation does 
not, however, raise an inference that Ernst harbored an 
intent to deceive or exhibited a reckless disregard for the 
likelihood of fraud by exercising divergent, but nevertheless 
principled, methodologies in auditing IKON's financial 
statements. 
 
The tabulation breaks down as follows. First, appellants 
contend that the lease default reserve (the amount 
maintained to offset unpaid leases that are charged back to 
individual marketplaces) in IKON Southern California was 
understated by $4.2 million. Appellants derive this figure 
by subtracting the recorded reserve rate of 1.8 percent from 
the historical lease default rate of 6 percent and applying 
the difference (4.2 percent) to the Southern California 
portfolio of $99,786,309 million (roughly $4.2 million). See 
Br. of Appellants at 22. They point to an internal report, in 
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which Ernst auditors noted the 4.2 percent discrepancy 
between default rate and reserve rate, to demonstrate 
actual knowledge on the part of Ernst of the shortfall. See 
J.A. 4820-25 (Report). 
 
Ernst challenges this calculation for its failure to adjust 
for "recoveries," the value of equipment retrieved from any 
defaulting lessees or the recovery obtained from defaulting 
lessees through settlement, litigation, or otherwise. 
Notwithstanding this observation, even were we to accept 
the accuracy of appellants' $4.2 million figure, 17 the "error" 
falls short of raising a material dispute with respect to 
scienter. To begin with, the record reveals that the internal 
audit report from which appellants purport to discern 
Ernst's culpable state of mind was a draft (marked for 
"discussion purposes only") and may not have been 
completed by the time Ernst concluded its 1997 audit.18 
More importantly, there is no evidence to rebut a 
conclusion that Ernst took reasonable steps to ensure the 
adequacy of IKON's default reserves overall. 19 Appellants 
cannot establish scienter merely by pointing to the $35 
million reserve adjustment registered during the Special 
Procedures in 1998, without affirmatively linking that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. It should be emphasized that IKON-Southern California accounted 
for only 2.2 percent of IKON's revenues and 0.7 percent of IKON's assets 
for 1997. IKON revenues for 1997 totaled over $5.1 billion. See J.A. 5151 
(Press Release). 
 
18. The draft report states that the compliance audit at IKON Southern 
California was completed as of October 24, 1997. See J.A. 4820 (Report). 
However, Ernst's workpapers suggest that the final audit report for IKON 
Southern California was not completed during fiscal 1997. See J.A. 
4828-31 (workpapers). Furthermore, Carmen Nepa, Ernst's senior audit 
manager, testified that he did not become aware of the internal audit 
report for Los Angeles until the first quarter of fiscal 1998, after Ernst 
had issued its 1997 opinion. See J.A. 3476 (Nepa Dep. 542-43). 
 
19. See J.A. 3478 (Nepa Dep. 550-51) ("the allowance for lease default 
was analyzed on a consolidated basis . . . a difference at one location 
would not -- would not matter to me as long as I-- as long as we 
concluded the consolidated reserve was adequate"); see also J.A. 4889 
(Slack Dep. 52) (vice president of IOS Capital, the financial leasing 
subsidiary of IKON, testifying that estimated losses for the lease 
portfolio 
in 1997 reasonably matched the amount reserved by IKON to account 
for defaults). 
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amount to problems known as of September 30, 1997. See 
Reply Br. of Appellants at 14. 
 
Appellants emphasize a $2.8 million overstatement in Los 
Angeles inventory. However, as Ernst correctly notes, that 
figure is predicated on a draft summary of findings for the 
Southern California district,20 which detailed a potential 
risk of misstatement in the event that inventory 
discrepancies remained unresolved. It does not, however, 
suggest that Ernst failed to address these concerns before 
publication of the audit opinion.21 Quite simply, appellants 
fail to explain how Ernst's awareness of discrete inventory 
problems in one IKON district is tantamount to scienter, to 
a mental state suggesting an intent to conceal IKON's true 
financial position from investors or a realistic expectation of 
likely public confusion regarding IKON's overall financial 
health. 
 
Appellants point next to a "known" $3.6 million shortfall 
in questionable receivables that were transferred from IKON 
Management Services unit ("IMS") to IKON Document 
Services ("IDS"). Appellants allege that Ernst knew of the 
"IDS/IMS Bad Debt Reserve" when its field auditors alerted 
Ernst personnel in Philadelphia to the fact that IDS did not 
maintain a separate reserve for dubious accounts 
receivable. See J.A. 315 (Summary Review Memo). 
 
However, quite apart from this warning, nothing in the 
record supports the claim that IDS was in fact under- 
reserved for 1997 or that Ernst Philadelphia did not take 
appropriate steps to evaluate accounts receivable. 
Furthermore, as Ernst points out, auditing estimated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The report, generated at the close of fiscal year 1997 by an internal 
audit, stated that there was a "need for an adjustment" with respect to 
approximately $2.8 million of unreconciled inventory and warned of an 
"increased risk of material misstatement" if the inventory issues were not 
investigated and resolved. See J.A. 4821 (Report). 
 
21. On the other hand, we are troubled by the fact that Ernst has not 
come forward with evidence of affirmative steps taken to resolve the risk. 
Though the threshold for scienter is considerable, we are wary to raise 
the bar even higher and insulate auditors who craftily choose not to 
memorialize confirmed problems or to qualify their observations with 
highly equivocal terms like "risk," "potential," and "likelihood." 
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reserves for doubtful accounts is a highly imperfect 
undertaking that requires an assessment of the risk that 
accounts may be defaulted on. As there is no evidence to 
suggest that Ernst's method of predicting collectibilty was 
unreasonable or grossly inconsistent with acceptable 
accounting practices, there is no basis to conclude that 
Ernst fraudulently certified that the reserve for doubtful 
accounts in IKON's consolidated financial statements 
comported with GAAP.22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. There has been substantial debate as to whether IKON accounting 
policy is equivalent to GAAP, such that Ernst's deviation from IKON's 
internal benchmarks for accounts receivable reserves necessarily would 
constitute deviation from GAAP and raise an inference of scienter. We 
finally may put that dispute to rest. IKON organized accounts receivable 
according to the length of time that an account was outstanding and 
fixed the amount of reserves required to cover those accounts (33 1/3 
percent of the amount reserved for receivables outstanding 91-150 days, 
66 2/3 percent for accounts aged 151-180 days, 100 percent for 
amounts aged greater than 180 days). See J.A. 4781 (workpaper). Ernst 
claims that it did not adhere strictly to IKON's policy in calculating 
adequate reserve amounts because, though useful to IKON in ensuring 
uniformity and guaranteeing a minimum reserve level for all districts, it 
was inflexible and did not take into account the presence of factors 
unique to individual districts. This discrepancy, however, is not 
dispositive because IKON's internal accounting standards would not 
have yielded the only reserve level acceptable under GAAP. GAAP is a 
term of art that encompasses a wide range of acceptable procedures. See 
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 544, 99 S.Ct. 773, 787 
(1979) (GAAP "are far from being a canonical set of rules that will ensure 
identical accounting treatment of identical transactions . . . . [R]ather, 
[they] tolerate a range of `reasonable' treatments, leaving the choice 
among alternatives to management"); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 
F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (as accounting concepts are 
flexible, circumstances will give rise to fraud only where differences in 
calculations are the result of a falsehood, "not merely the difference 
between two permissible judgments"); Godchaux v. Conveying 
Techniques, Inc., 846 F.2d 306, 315 (5th Cir. 1988) (a reasonable 
accountant may choose to apply any of a variety of acceptable 
procedures when preparing a financial statement). As such, the fact that 
appellants can demonstrate that Ernst's allowance for doubtful accounts 
deviated from IKON's accounting policies does not raise a plausible 
inference that Ernst was reckless or intended to publish materially false 
information, let alone deviated from GAAP. 
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Appellants assert that Ernst missed approximately $4.0 
million in known IDS intercompany balances during the 
1997 audit, but the evidence on this point suggests nothing 
more than simple error, at best approaching negligence, not 
scienter. Approximately $7.3 million in intercompany errors 
came to light during the Special Procedures, a figure that 
includes the $4.0 million related to IDS and IMS. See J.A. 
786-89 (Special Procedures Summary of Adjustments). 
Appellants maintain that Ernst "knew" of the imbalance 
both from a broad familiarity with IKON's historic problems 
with expunging redundant balances and from explicit 
written warnings sent to Ernst Philadelphia from Ernst 
Houston emphasizing the need to eliminate accounts at 
IDS/IMS. 
 
Yet those written warnings contain only a very general 
admonition "to ensure intercompany accounts eliminate on 
a consolidated basis," and appellants offer no additional 
evidence to show that the $4.0 million figure discovered in 
1998 corresponds with the imbalance identified by Ernst 
Houston in 1997. Moreover, to the extent that Ernst may 
have erred in failing to eliminate intercompany assets from 
pre-tax earnings, an inference of recklessness or intent to 
deceive that otherwise might be drawn cannot survive the 
fact that Ernst thoroughly reviewed and tested IKON's 
intercompany balances. See J.A. 3489 (Nepa Dep. 593); 
J.A. 5262-5289 (workpaper); J.A. 928-29 (October 10, 1997 
letter). 
 
Finally, appellants claim that there was a known 
misrepresentation of $6.2 million involving the 1997 
Summary of Audit Differences ("SAD"), the list documenting 
discrepancies between IKON's numbers and Ernst's 
conclusions. However, as appellants have acknowledged, 
Ernst's failure to require IKON to adjust its financial 
statements by $6.2 million is only material when 
considered in the context of the $14.6 million in claimed 
errors with respect to lease default reserve, inventory, 
accounts receivable, and intercompany balances that we 
already have addressed. See Br. of Appellants at 27. 
Considering that these errors have been discounted, 
without some additional evidence insinuating scienter, the 
$6.2 million pertaining to the SAD does not supply a basis 
to establish scienter. 
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The $31 million in allegedly "reckless" misstatements 
appellants charge also cannot be the basis to establish 
scienter. First, the allegation that Ernst's failure to 
reconcile accounts resulted in a $10.4 million 
overstatement does not support a finding of the requisite 
scienter.23 The claim that appellants' experts, in retrospect, 
would have compared assets against balance sheets on a 
monthly basis or that IKON's internal policy called for 
monthly reconciliation of accounts payable, accounts 
receivable, cash, and inventory, does not illustrate that 
Ernst's incongruous auditing tactics were unjustified, let 
alone reflected an intent to defraud or rash disregard for 
the likelihood of deception. 
 
The balance of allegedly "reckless" errors relate to $20.6 
million of shortfalls in accounts receivable reserves.24 
Appellants' experts opined that IKON's transformation 
initiative seriously impaired account collectibility and, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. This figure regarding reconciliations was calculated during the 
Special Procedures, one year after Ernst issued its 1997 clean audit 
opinion. See J.A. 788-89 (Special Procedures Summary of Adjustments). 
 
24. There has been considerable ambiguity surrounding the $20.6 
million figure cited by appellants. Initially, appellants included the 
allegedly "known" $3.6 million shortfall in IDS/IMS reserves to arrive at 
this figure. See Br. of Appellants at 28; see also Reply Br. of Appellants 
at 1; Transcript of Oral Argument at 74 ("[t]hat item would probably also 
be included in the 20-plus million dollar account receivable. . . There is 
a duplication."). Subsequent to oral argument, appellants submitted a 
memorandum on October 16, 2001, in which they now maintain that the 
$20.6 million does not double count the $3.6 million shortfall in 
IDS/IMS reserves and instead consists of $17,089,000 in inadequate 
accounts receivable allowance and $3,234,000 in intercompany accounts 
that did not eliminate. Appellants presented similar figures to the 
district 
court. See 131 F. Supp. 2d at 693 n.3. Nevertheless, in the interest of 
fairness, we address the $20.6 million only with respect to shortfalls in 
accounts receivable reserves, as Ernst was not presented with an 
opportunity to address the $3,234,000 in intercompany accounts that 
allegedly were not eliminated. See Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 
F.2d 
430, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1990). In any event, appellants have not directed us 
to portions of the record that suggest recklessness on the part of Ernst 
for failing to eliminate the $3.3 million in intercompany balances. To the 
contrary, the record suggests that Ernst reconciled intercompany 
accounts at the consolidated level. See J.A. 5262 (workpaper). 
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therefore, Ernst should have enforced IKON's more 
conservative policy to estimate appropriate reserve 
minimums. 
 
However, as discussed previously,25 highlighting different 
accounting methodologies that Ernst might have employed 
-- particularly in the nebulous context of establishing 
reserves for vulnerable accounts -- does not suggest that 
the approach actually chosen was an extreme departure 
from ordinary care. 
 
For example, appellants point to the fact that IKON 
Northern California's deficient computer system could not 
properly assess the accounts receivable reserves. Yet the 
record confirms that Ernst took reasonable, additional 
steps to audit those reserves. In its September 30, 1997 
summary review memorandum, Ernst details the host of 
problems identified and procedures instituted during the 
audit of IKON Northern California. See J.A. 887-893. After 
IKON conducted an internal audit of approximately 100 
accounts receivable and recommended a reserve of at least 
$7 million, Ernst auditors reviewed the work and actually 
proposed increased reserves for doubtful accounts 
receivable. See J.A. 4802 (showing $5.3 million adjustment 
on the Summary of Audit Differences). Indeed, rather than 
"stripping" reserves as appellants have maintained, IKON 
substantially increased its overall allowance for doubtful 
accounts by some $20 million on Ernst's recommendation 
in 1997. See J.A. 5292, 5298 (workpapers). Plainly, without 
some additional support, the GAAP methodologies advanced 
by appellants' experts fall short of transforming Ernst's 
estimates of accounts receivable reserves into actionable 
fraud. 
 
In short, appellants' citations to the record, like 
misshapen jigsaw pieces that collectively fail to reveal the 
picture embedded within the puzzle, simply raise no 
inference that Ernst opined on IKON's consolidated 
financial statements with knowing or reckless disregard for 
the truth.26 There is no reasonable basis in the record to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
 
26. We do not suggest, however, that individual defects in an audit could 
not, in the aggregate, create an inference of scienter, particularly at 
the 
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doubt that Ernst harbored an honest and well-founded 
belief in the accuracy of its audit, and, without further 
substantiating evidence, a jury may not premise a finding 
of willful or knowing conduct to defraud or recklessness 
merely by judging between competing but nevertheless 
sound accounting methodologies. 
 
       2. Loss Causation 
 
As there is no triable issue with respect to scienter, 
appellants' prima facie section 10(b) claim fails, and we 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court entered February 6, 2001. 
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summary judgment stage. To the contrary, in many cases the most 
plausible means to prevail on a section 10(b) claim against an auditor -- 
without that ever-elusive "smoking gun" document or admission -- will 
be to show how specific and not insignificant accounting violations 
collectively raise an inference of scienter. We conclude only that the 
record before us in this case does not rise to such a level. 
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